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CEO Compensation Structure and Capital Ratios at US Banks 
Bradley Heuer-LaSalle University 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The banking industry operates as an important part of everyday American life. Millions of 
Americans use banks as a financial instrument through which they can make deposits and take out 
loans. CEOs, in charge of banks across the US, are some of the highest paid employees in America. 
Because of their high pay and relative power over business decisions, compensation practice has 
become a widely discussed topic among government officials. Executives can be compensated in two 
ways: one way would be to pay the executive in cash, whereas the other method would be to pay the 
executive in incentives (discussed later in this paper). The worry among government officials is that 
certain types of compensation can lead to bank riskiness and failure which in turn may cause a general 
mistrust of banks across America.  
A recent bank failure can provide an example of executive compensation practices promoting 
bank riskiness and failure. Westsound bank was closed on May 8, 2009 by the FDIC. In closing the bank, 
the FDIC published a Material Loss Review which reviewed reasons for why the bank was to be closed. A 
discussion of risk management practices and failed compensation practices is seen in the report. 
Westbound Westsound failed because its board of directors and management did not implement risk-
management practices commensurate with rapid growth and a loan portfolio with significant 
concentrations in higher-risk acquisition, development and construction (ADC) real estate loans. 
Specifically, weak loan underwriting and credit administration practices associated with ADC 
concentrations became apparent as the local real estate market deteriorated. As loan losses related to 
the ADC loans were recognized, capital eroded and liquidity became strained. A contributing factor to 
the losses was an inadequately designed and monitored incentive compensation program under which 
one bank official generated the vast majority of the poor quality loans. Westsound’s viability was also 
impacted by negative publicity which prompted depositors to leave the bank.1 Simply stated, Westsound 
bank took risks because executive compensation practices incentivized certain bank officials to generate 
massive returns for themselves, while simultaneously putting the bank at risk for failure.  
  It is easy to see the importance of both executive pay structure and capital ratios. This paper will 
seek to establish a relationship between the two. It’s important to define what this paper will look at in 
terms of executive compensation and what capital ratios it will look at as well. Many studies have been 
published trying to establish a relationship between certain aspects of executive compensation. To 
continue these studies, this paper will discuss banks in America and will seek to establish a relationship 
between CEO compensation and capital ratios at these banks. That relationship will be defined as 
follows: The higher percentage of incentive based pay the CEO is compensated with, the lower the 
capital ratios, indicating a riskier bank. To begin, a simplified background on the functions of a bank will 
be provided. Next, this paper will introduce the agencies that monitor banks and provide a brief 
background of those agencies. The next section will discuss the capital ratios and aspects of executive 
compensation. A discussion of previous studies will follow. Then, a relationship between executive 
                                                          
1 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Office of the Inspector General. Material Loss Review of Westsound Bank, 
Bremerton (2009) 
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compensation and capital ratios will be established using regression analysis. Next, results from 
regression analysis, using these two variables, will be displayed and interpreted. The paper will end with 
a conclusion about this relationship. The goal is to better understand this relationship in the hopes of 
helping future regulators monitor banks.    
The Balance Sheet 
Commercial banks play an important part in the financial industry by providing a safe way for 
people to deposit cash and borrow money. Even though this seems simple, banks can become 
complicated with their use of different financial tools that they provide to their customers. To better 
understand what a bank does, it’s easier to break it down into the different parts of a banks’ balance 
sheet. 
A bank performs two important operations in daily activities. The liability side of a bank contains 
deposits. Deposits are a tool through which customers can safely invest their disposable income so that 
they can save it for spending later. Deposits provide a bank with the money it needs to make a profit 
through its daily operations, such as providing loans. Banks offer a rate of return on deposits to attract 
customers. This rate of return changes based on the type of deposit account a customer has with the 
bank.  
The asset side of a bank does the exact opposite of taking money in; it lends money out. As 
stated above deposits provide a source of money to a bank so it can write loans. Loans are a tool banks 
use to provide money to individuals or businesses. For example, a bank may lend individuals money so 
they can purchase a house. Also, it may lend money to someone to start a business, or for a large 
company to build infrastructure. Customers are required to pay this loan back over a specified period of 
time. In addition, banks charge an interest on loans to compensate the bank for lending out money to 
customers rather than using the money for some other investment activity. The interest rate a bank 
charges on a loan is based on many factors and reflects the credit risk (chance money is not paid back) 
of the loan. Riskier loans have higher interest rates because there is a higher percent of default meaning 
the bank does not receive its money back from the customer and charges off the loan (removes it from 
the balance sheet). 
At most banks liabilities and assets are not equal. This means that a bank’s assets, or 
loans/investments, are not fully funded by its liabilities, or deposits. To fund the rest of its assets, a bank 
will have a third section on its balance sheet: equity. Equity will consist of the market value of the shares 
of stock invested in a bank plus any net income from the previous year that was retained. It is then 
added to the previous balance of retained earnings. But at a bank equity is referred to as capital. Capital 
has an important role at a bank acting as a safety net for the bank. It provides safety if for some reason 
many charge-offs occur and the bank is unable to recover the money lent to these customers. Capital is 
built in to prevent the bank from becoming insolvent by covering these losses. A bank can raise capital 
through a few means. One common way would be by selling shares of stock. Another way is by adding 
to retained earnings using income from the previous year. 
In summary, a bank takes deposits and makes loans. Banks offer different deposit accounts, with 
a higher rate of return, to attract customers to longer-term deposits. These deposits allow a bank to 
make loans to an individual or business. Banks charge an interest rate on these loans, a rate higher than 
the one they provide on their deposit accounts. Banks profit from the interest margin. A bank also 
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profits by investing in securities. Capital is also on a banks’ balance sheet. It provides a safety net if 
customers were to stop paying back their loans. Banks are an important part of the American economy, 
and because of this are regulated by the government.     
Regulators 
There are several regulators of banks across the United States, but for the purposes of this 
paper, this section will discuss three of the primary regulators: The Federal Reserve (Fed), The Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Together, 
these three regulators work with one another to ensure that banks are operating safely and soundly. 
Regulators also provide consumer protection and work for a more stable economy as a whole. 
One regulator of banks in the United States is the Federal Reserve System. The Fed acts as the 
central bank in the US through which monetary policy is enacted. Monetary policy is the tool through 
which the Federal Reserve controls interest rates. The purpose of controlling interest rates is to keep the 
economy stable to prevent future recessions. The Fed also monitors and regulates state banks. A state 
bank is a member of the Federal Reserve System through an application, and is typically smaller than 
larger national banks, or banks with assets of over $50 billion. The Fed assists the other two regulators in 
monitoring and regulating larger US banks. The Fed is also the primary regulator for bank holding 
companies in the US. A bank holding company is a company that owns banks and they are typically set 
up for the purposes of raising capital for its subsidiary banks.  
Another regulator of banks in the US is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Similar to 
the Fed, the OCC supervises and monitors banks to ensure that banks aren’t becoming too risky. The 
OCC helps the Fed by regulating national banks. A bank is considered a national bank when it has assets 
that total over $50 billion. National banks are all members of the Federal Reserve System, but the OCC is 
the primary regulator for these banks.  
Similar to the Fed and the OCC, the FDIC helps to supervise and monitor banks. If a state bank 
(smaller bank) is not a member of the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC becomes that bank’s primary 
regulator. In addition, the FDIC also insures deposits of up to $250,000. This implies that if a bank were 
to go out of business, those customers would not lose their deposits because the FDIC insures them and 
will reimburse deposits held in that bank.     
Together, these three agencies establish laws that prevent banks from becoming too risky. In 
addition, banks must go through regular exams from at least one of these three regulators. During these 
exams, bank examiners look at the financial statements and give the bank a rating. This rating is based 
on how well the bank is running its daily operations while also being risk averse. A lower rating may 
indicate a “problem institution,” meaning the bank may go out of business. These exams ensure that 
banks are able to stay in business, while providing peace of mind to customers who use the bank on a 
daily basis.  
During exams, banks are rated on a scale of 1, the best score a bank can receive, to a 5, the 
worst score a bank can receive. Examiners look at 6 main aspects of a bank’s financial statements when 
on an exam. The acronym CAMELS describes what examiners look at. C stands for Capital Adequacy, 
meaning that examiners ensure banks have sufficient capital to run its daily business and write loans.  
For the purpose of this paper, and its goal of establishing a relationship between executive 
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compensation and capital ratios, I will only look at the C in CAMELS. Capital ratios play an important role 
in banking because they exemplify if a bank can withstand some adverse situation, such as an economic 
downturn or an increase in charge-offs. Capital ratios provide a measure of capital risk at banks. The 
higher the capital ratio, the lower the capital risk and vice versa. They also show a bank’s ability to write 
more or less loans. Executive salary also plays an important role at a bank and is observed when 
examiners rate management, or the M, at a bank. This paper will examine this relationship, between 
executive salary and capital ratios, with the goal of assisting bank regulators in the future.   
Executive Compensation, Capital Ratios and Risk 
The board of directors plays a key role in the daily activities of the bank. The board consists of 
people both inside and outside of bank management. Some members of executive management may sit 
on the board, such as the CEO of the bank. The board communicates to executive management on 
behalf of the policy holders. In addition, the board is in charge of oversight of the bank, but does not 
manage the bank on daily basis. The board ensures that management reaching objective’s to meet the 
banks’ risk appetite.2  
The board is also responsible for creating and implementing a compensation policy for upper 
level management.3 Compensation should allow a financial institution to attract, retain, and motivate 
qualified management adhering to standards applicable to a safe and sound organization while creating 
value for shareholders and other stated stakeholders.4 The board’s responsibility when devising a 
compensation structure is to create a program that allows upper level management to effectively run 
the bank. It is also used to promote certain risk taking, by executive management, at a bank. It is 
believed that some forms of compensation promote risk as opposed to others. Bank regulatory agencies 
throughout the world believe that poorly structured incentive compensation programs encouraged 
bankers to pursue financial and business strategies that overly rewarded excessive risk leading to failure 
before and during the Panic of 20085 the most recent financial crisis in the US. In response, the agencies 
devised laws in the hopes that executive compensation structures would be better managed to avoid 
excessive risk taking.  
Executives at banks manage risk using risk management practices. Risk management represents 
the process by which a bank identifies and controls their exposure to risk6. It is management’s 
responsibility to develop and monitor risk management practices to ensure the bank does not fail. After 
the crisis of 2008, there was a belief that incentive based compensation, such as stock options or equity, 
led to executive management not properly developing risk management practices that would keep the 
bank safe. A Forbes article from 2011 stated “actions motivated by short-term self-interest on the part 
of those in the financial services industry brought about near collapse of our financial system in 2008 
and 2009.” In other words, the ones in the financial world who benefitted, despite deep financial woes, 
                                                          
2 Comptroller of the Currency, The Role of a National Bank Director (1997), 11-12 
3 Comptroller, The Role of a National Bank Director, 25 
4 Handorf, William C. "Bank Risk Management, Regulation and CEO Compensation after the Panic of 2008." Journal 
of Banking Regulation 16.1 (2013), 40. 
5 Handorf, “Bank Risk Management,” 41-42 
6 Handorf, “Bank Risk Management,” 40 
 
5 
  
were the ones who also reaped the most handsome rewards. This has caused regulators to become 
weary of compensation structure because of its possible association with risk taking at banks.  
Executive compensation is defined as the financial payments and non-monetary benefits 
provided to high level management in exchange for their work on behalf of an organization. Typically all 
upper level management fall under this term, but this paper will look at compensation of the CEO. 
Executive compensation has a few different parts. The first is base salary. This is the fixed dollar amount 
that an executive is paid per year. Another part is any bonuses provided to the CEO. Both salary and 
bonuses are considered cash-based forms of compensation. Equity-based compensation occurs when 
executives are compensated with shares of stock in the company. Equity-based compensation is seen as 
an incentive form of payment because it is not required to be paid to an executive, whereas salary is 
required to be paid.  
One way risk can measured at banks is through capital ratios. One common ratio used by 
regulators is called the capital adequacy ratio. This is determined by taking total capital and dividing it 
into risk weighted assets (Capital/RWA). Risk weighted assets are when a bank’s assets are given certain 
weights based on the perceived riskiness of the asset. This means that the riskier assets carry a higher 
weight and cause the total amount of RWA to increase.7 When this ratio is low, the bank has more risk-
weighted assets compared to capital. This means the bank may not be able to sufficiently cover itself if 
customers begin to fail on their loans (the safety net is not large enough).  
On occasions, capital ratios start to decline at banks. One way capital ratios decline is when 
earnings are impaired by large losses from high-risk and often high-yield loans or securities; the result is 
especially damaging when a portfolio is concentrated in the asset group experiencing exceptionally high 
slow, nonaccrual, restructured or loss status8. This means that the bank attempts to grow by lending out 
more money to possibly risky customers. When this happens, assets increase while capital stays the 
same. The bank now may be unable to support itself if some adverse event were to happen because it 
may not have enough capital to cover these risky loans that might not be paid back. Many institutions 
experiencing capital problems respond by shrinking their balance sheet to reduce the asset base more 
quickly than capital is dissipated by losses to shore up fragile capital ratios9. Banks may sell assets to get 
capital ratios back up causing them to generate less profit. When it’s obvious a bank is selling assets to 
improve capital ratios, credit agencies take notice and will downgrade the bank, making it harder, and 
more expensive, for the bank to receive a loan. Overall, when capital ratios decline, or are low to begin 
with, the bank is considered risky.  
Capital, as described above, plays an important role at a bank. It’s important to describe the 
different types of capital. The first is called Tier 1 capital and it includes qualifying common stock and 
related surplus of net treasury stock and retained earnings. Tier 1 capital is widely recognized as the 
most loss absorbing form of capital, as it is permanent and places shareholders’ funds at risk of loss in 
the event of insolvency. The second type of capital is called Tier 2 capital and it includes the allowance 
                                                          
7 Federal Reserve System, Rules and  Regulations (2013), 62020 
8 Handorf, “Bank Risk Management,” 40 
9 Handorf, “Bank Risk Management,” 40 
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for loan and lease loss up to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets, qualifying preferred stock, and 
subordinated debt. The third is total capital, and that is the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital.10 
This paper will look at several capital ratios. The first is called the tier 1 leverage ratio and it is 
measured by dividing Tier 1 capital into a banks average total consolidated assets (Tier1/AvgAssets). The 
second ratio I this paper will look at is the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio. It is measured by dividing a 
bank’s Tier 1 capital into its risk-weighted assets (Tier 1/RWA). The third ratio used will be the total risk-
based capital ratio. It is measured by dividing a bank’s total capital into risk weighted assets (Total 
Capital/RWA).11   
In 2013, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC published Basel III which legally established 
minimum capital ratios for banks. Basel III states ratios of Tier 1 capital to RWA of 6%, Total capital to 
total RWA of 8%, and Tier 1 to average total assets of 4%.12 The purpose of Basel III was to set capital 
ratios high with the goal of preventing a future recession. Capital ratios were low during the recession of 
2008, but with the help of Basel III ratios will be held high to hopefully prevent banks from going out of 
business during an adverse event in the future.  
This paper seeks to establish a relationship between executive compensation and capital ratios 
and this relationship is as follows: the higher percentage incentive-based pay the CEO is 
compensated with, the lower the capital ratios. The more a CEO is paid in cash-based 
compensation, the less risky a bank will be in terms of capital, meaning their ratios will be higher. The 
goal of this paper will be to prove this hypothesis in the hopes of helping future regulators establish laws 
on the amount of incentive-based compensation an executive can receive, to avoid banks from 
becoming too risky in terms of their capital. The following section discuses studies, which have been 
done in the past that also sought to establish a relationship between executive compensation and the 
perceived riskiness of a bank.  
2.) RELATION TO EXISTING LITERATURE 
 There have been previous studies completed on the relationship between CEO compensation 
and perceived bank riskiness. A study done in 2001, by Hermalin and Wallace, looked at agency theory, a 
theory that predicts that a managers’ compensation should be positively correlated with his firm 
performance.13 Simply stated, a CEO should be paid more when the firm he/she is managing performs 
better. The study attempted to incorporate base salary and bank risk. Bank risk was measured by beta, 
which compares a bank’s stock return to the total economy. A bank with a beta of 1 has stock that 
moves directly in line with the economy. A lower beta indicates less movement in stock returns and may 
indicate a lower risk bank. A higher beta indicates a stock price that is volatile and may indicate higher 
risk. The study found evidence consistent with the agency theory and concluded by stating that 
managerial compensation increases with firm risk to compensate managers for bearing that risk. This 
study implied that bank CEOs are paid more when they manage a risky bank to compensate them for 
effectively managing a lot of risk. Other studies broke down executive compensation to try and connect 
                                                          
10 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Manual of Examination Policies. (section 2, 1990), 9-10 
11 FDIC, Manual of Examination Policies. (section 2, 1990), 7 
12 FDIC, Manual of Examination Policies. (section 2, 1990), 7 
13 Hermalin BE, Wallace NE "Firm Performance and Executive Compensation in the Savings and Loan Industry," 
(61.1, 2001) 140.  
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aspects of executive compensation to bank risk, rather than connecting executive compensation to the 
agency theory.    
 Palia and Porter (2004) studied managerial incentive compensation and capital requirements 
and the effect these two variables have on bank charter value and bank risk. Charter value arises out of 
the value created when a bank obtains the ability to operate in a regulated environment. The two 
measured charter value by using the variable Tobin’s Q. This variable measures the bank’s future profit-
generating potential arising from such things as efficiency, market power, and customer relationships. 
To state it simply, Tobin’s Q exemplifies how well a bank is managed and the future profit the bank can 
establish based on how well it is being managed. The two measured capital by using a risk-based capital 
ratio and a book-value capital ratio. Executive compensation was looked at in terms of salary and 
bonuses (cash-based compensation) versus the value of stock held by managers (incentive-based 
compensation). Bank risk was measured by observing the standard deviation of total return on a bank’s 
stock. The larger the standard deviation, the more the stock price changes/is volatile, and the higher the 
bank’s perceived risk. 
 The two were able to establish some relationships based on the variables described above. In a 
regression with the bank book-value capital ratio while controlling for bank size we find the value of 
options to be significant at the 10% level. The sign of the coefficient is positive implying higher levels of 
options result in a higher charter value is the first discovery made. This means that the team found a 
relationship that shows bank charter values increase as executives are compensated with more stock 
options. The second discovery that is made is increased capital levels decrease risk when risk is 
measured by the standard deviation of total return. This relationship exemplifies that the more capital 
the bank has on its balance sheet, the lower the risk at a bank. The final discovery was that increases in 
CEO stock holdings produce increases in risk. This relationship exemplifies that the more stock a CEO 
owns in a bank, the riskier the bank, when risk is measured by the standard deviation of returns.14  
 A study done by Fortin, Goldberg, and Roth (2006) was able to establish a similar relationship 
that Palia and Porter established in 2004. The three used a sample of 83 of the largest bank-holding 
companies in the US. They wanted to compare whether bank-specific characteristics in place in 2005 are 
related to bank risk-taking in 2006. The study looked at how executives were compensated in 2005. 
Compensation was broken down by base salary, market value of stock ownership, and any bonuses. The 
goal was to connect these variables to bank risk in 2006, measured by the standard deviation of daily 
share returns. Researchers participating in the study believed that options-based executive 
compensation is expected to increase managerial incentives to take risk because volatility in the 
underlying share price increases its value. The researchers believed if managers were given more shares 
of stock, they would take more risk to make the stock more volatile. A stock being volatile means that 
the price of the stock changes a lot, and this increases the value of the stock. The study concluded by 
making the statement that bank CEOs who are paid higher base salaries take less risk and in contrast, 
bank CEOs who are paid more in bonuses or in stock options take more risk.15  
                                                          
14 Palia, Darius, and Porter, "The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter 
Value,"(2004), 191-206 
15 Fortin, Rich, Gerson M. Goldberg, and Greg Roth. "Bank Risk Taking at the Onset of the Current Banking Crisis," 
(2006), 891-913  
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 The results of these studies align with similar results found in an earlier study done by Kose, 
Saunders and Senbet (2000). The team studied the effects of an FDIC insurance premium scheme that 
assessed and placed banks into categories based on their capital. Categories ranged from well-
capitalized to capitalized to under-capitalized. The goal of the study was to prove that incentive features 
of top-management compensation should be included in the FDIC insurance premium scheme. The 
study measured top executive compensation and was able to successfully connect it to bank risk, 
measured by the standard deviation of stock returns. They also concluded that bank risk decreases as 
managers’ salary and bonuses increase.16     
 A paper published by Guo, Jalal, and Khaksari (2014) expanded upon the findings of the previous 
studies. In their paper they examined 3 relationships; (1) how the composition of executive 
compensation is related to a bank’s incentive to take risk, (2) whether executive compensation in larger 
banks, especially too-big-to-fail banks (TBTF), induces more severe moral hazard behavior, and (3) how 
the relation between executive compensation and risk taking changes before and during the recent 
financial crisis.  
The team expanded on bank risk measures to paint a larger, more complete picture of risk at 
banks. They measured risk using the standard deviation of the bank’s stock returns and the standard 
deviation of the return on assets as an alternative measure of bank risk. The higher these standard 
deviations, the more volatile and risky the bank becomes. The trio also used the Z-score as a measure of 
bank risk. The Z-score measures the distance from bank insolvency, insolvency meaning the bank’s 
inability to pay back its debt and cover its deposits. The lower the Z-score, the closer a bank is to 
insolvency. The team also looked at problem institutions to classify a risky bank. They classified a bank 
as a problem institution if its problem loans to equity ratio is over the 85th percentile of all US banks on 
an annual basis. This would show if a bank is having trouble with customers defaulting on loans and if 
the bank does not have a large enough capital base to cover these problem loans. In addition, the team 
also looked at banks with a CAMEL rating of 3, 4, or 5. A bank with a CAMEL rating of 3, 4, or 5 is viewed 
as a problem bank by regulators. A bank that is classified as a problem institution is considered a risky 
institution.  
The team tested several variables that could possibly have an effect of bank riskiness. One of 
these variables was executive compensation, which they broke down between salary, bonuses, and 
long-term incentives (i.e. shares of stock). Another variable used was Tobin’s Q which is estimated by 
the bank’s market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities, divided by the book value of assets. 
They used the variable as a proxy for a bank’s growth opportunities to try and peg a relationship 
between growth opportunities and riskiness at a bank. A third variable tested against risk was too big to 
fail (TBTF) institutions, which is classified by if the institution is one of the ten largest bank-holding 
companies by size in a particular year. The team tested this variable because it is reasonable to assume 
that these largest institutions are more likely to be bailed out by the US given their failure’s potential 
impact on systematic risk. If a bank is more likely to be bailed out, it may have greater incentive to take 
more risk. The final variable tested against risk was gindex which is a measure of the quality of corporate 
governance. The score ranges from 1 to 24 and higher gindex is associated with less shareholder rights 
and greater power of management. If a bank has a low gindex score, meaning more shareholder rights, 
                                                          
16 John, Kose, Anthony Saunders, and Lemma W. Senbet. "A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management 
Compensation," (2000), 95-125  
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it may be considered as risky. Given more rights, shareholders may manage the bank to make their stock 
price more volatile and thus more valuable, but a volatile stock price shows an increase in bank risk.  
The paper ended with a few conclusions. First, they found that bank risk measured by the Z-
score and volatility of stock returns increases with incentive compensation.  This conclusion is in line 
with the previous papers’ conclusions that greater stock-based pay increases bank risk, when measured 
by the standard deviation of stock returns. This conclusion adds to the previous papers by also 
connecting stock-based compensation with the Z-score at a bank, which measures the distance from 
insolvency. Another conclusion made was that greater proportion of incentive pay is positively related 
to banks’ valuation and performance. This result is similar to a third finding in the paper that states, 
“greater proportion of incentive pay does not increase the likelihood for a bank to become a problem or 
failed institution.” These findings create a relationship that greater incentive pay for executives may 
help bank performance, and also do not necessarily cause the bank to become a problem institution. 
Although the first finding shows that incentive pay increases bank risk, these findings show that 
incentive pay doesn’t necessarily mean the bank will become a problem institution. (It is important to 
note that bank riskiness and problem institution were measured using different variables).  
The last two conclusions were about TBTF institutions. The team found that TBTF banks 
experience greater risk taking (lower Z-score) and are more likely to be in financial distress than smaller 
banks. This conclusion is in line with the hypothesis that TBTF banks may take more risks because they 
are more likely to be bailed out by the government. The team also found that greater incentive 
compensation in TBTF banks helps reduce their insolvency risk relative to smaller institutions. This 
conclusion is interesting in that smaller banks, paying their executives with more incentive 
compensation, may take more risks than larger banks with a similar compensation structure.17   
A study published Handorf (2013) also expanded on bank risk. The goal was to understand if 
new compensation practices, established by banks after the financial crisis in 2008, helped to mitigate 
risk. Handorf posed the question; does compensation practice after new rules have been instituted 
reward safe and sound operations or encourage risk-taking? New rules are those rules established by 
the Dodd-Frank Act, a congressional act put into place after the financial crisis in 2008. The Dodd-Frank 
Act had a goal of preventing banks performing activities that helped cause the crisis in 2008.18 
 Handorf looked at capital risk in banks before, during, and after the crisis. He did this by looking 
at two variables: the Tier 1 capital ratio, and a variable that compared bank’s problem assets against its 
capital plus its allowance for loan and lease losses (problem assets ratio). He looked at capital risk to 
understand if banks were abiding by new rules established in Dodd-Frank that raised capital 
requirements. Handorf states within a range, regulators prefer more capital, whereas bankers prefer 
less capital. Higher capital makes it harder on bankers to leverage return on assets to return on equity so 
important value creation can be made in the stock market. Handorf tested the tier 1 capital ratio by 
stating if a compensation committee or board of director’s wishes to reward prudent risk management 
to lessen the probability of failure or supervisory merger, we should observe a positive correlation 
between adjusted compensation and levels of tier 1 leverage capital. That is, better capitalized banks 
should more highly reward their CEO. Handorf found a positive correlation coefficient that implied that 
                                                          
17 Guo, Lin, Abu Jalal, and Shahriar Khaksari. "Bank Executive Compensation Structure, Risk Taking and the 
Financial Crisis" (2014) 610-638  
18 Koba, Mark, CNBC. (2013) 
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better capitalized banks were more highly rewarding their CEO. Handorf also tested the problem assets 
ratio by stating if prudent lending and attention to capital and the allowance for loan loss is rewarded, 
there should be a negative relationship between the ratio of a bank’s problematic assets and capital. 
That is, banks with more capital and fewer problem loans should be more highly compensated. Handorf 
found a negative correlation proving that executives were better compensated when there was more 
attention to capital and the allowance for loan and lease losses.  
 Handorf also tested asset risk at banks. The first way he did this was by looking at asset yield. He 
believed that banks with high-yield assets presumably have originated or purchased high-risk credits or 
invested in high risk securities more susceptible to loss meaning that a higher asset yield may indicate 
loans that may default. He tested asset yield by stating if the board is now rewarding prudent lending 
and investment strategy, rather than short-term profits and risk-taking, we should observe a negative 
correlation between asset yield and adjusted compensation. That is, banks posting lesser interest 
income should better compensate their CEOs. He found a negative correlation indicating that banks with 
a lower asset yield, meaning less risky assets, compensate their CEO better. Handorf also tested asset 
risk by looking at the provision at banks. The provision is part of the balance sheet and is used to 
increase the allowance for loan and lease losses. A higher provision indicates the bank needs to increase 
its allowance for loan and lease losses to cover for risky and possible default loans. Handorf tested the 
provision by stating if a board of directors rewards a careful program of lending, we should see a 
negative relationship between the provision metric and adjusted compensation. That is, banks incurring 
lesser provisions should compensate CEOs better. He found a negative correlation indicating banks with 
lower provisions are compensating their executives better. The final way Handorf viewed asset risk was 
by looking at net loan loss. The net loan loss ratio shows assets that have been charged off (removed 
from the balance sheet) versus loans that have been recovered from being written/charged-off early. 
Handorf tests the net loan loss ratio by stating, if a board of directors has elected to reward safe and 
sound lending, we should observe a negative relationship between the net loss ratio and adjusted 
compensation. That is, banks incurring fewer net losses should more highly compensate their executive 
management. Handorf found a negative correlation indicating that executives were better compensated 
for keeping the net loan loss ratio low.     
 The final risk Handorf looked at was liquidity risk. The first variable he used, as an indicator of 
liquidity risk, was the net non-core funding ratio. This ratio is defined as non-core funds less short-term 
securities all divided by long-term assets. Non-core funds include uninsured deposits, brokered deposits 
and other sources of funds that may not easily be renewed or are subject to disintermediation. From a 
liquidity risk perspective, the higher the net non-core funding ratio, the higher the risk. Unfortunately, 
Handorf was unable to find a correlation coefficient significant enough to make a conclusion about this 
ratio and executive compensation. The second variable Handorf measured was net loans and leases 
ratio, which is taken by comparing net loans and leases to assets. Loans are viewed as being harder to 
convert to cash than other assets, meaning a higher ratio of loans to assets will increase liquidity risk. 
Handorf was also unable to find a correlation coefficient significant enough to connect compensation to 
this ratio. The final variable Handorf looked at to measure liquidity risk is the financial strength rating. 
This rating reflects, the probability a bank may require financial assistance from their holding company, 
shareholders or the government. Banks needing funding from these sources may be experiencing some 
liquidity risk. Handorf tests this variable by stating if the financial strength metric truly reflects potential 
liquidity exposure and is used by a board of directors when crafting compensation programs, the 
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relationship should prove negative. That is, banks perceived to have a higher probability of requiring 
financial assistance should pay CEOs less. He found a negative correlation meaning that CEOs are being 
paid less if there is a perceived higher probability of financial assistance.19 
 Handorf’s study was able to make several conclusions about CEO compensation and capital, 
asset, and liquidity risk at banks. Unfortunately, his study did not test different parts of total CEO 
compensation on these different risk measures, but rather tested more versus less total compensation. 
Other studies, discussed above, broke down CEO compensation to connect it to bank risk by separating 
base salary, bonuses, and stock-based compensation. Many of these papers measured bank risk 
primarily by looking at the standard deviation of stock returns.  
This study will be different from the ones described above for a few reasons. First, it will break 
down CEO compensation unlike Handorf’s paper. Also, instead of looking at the standard deviation of 
stock returns as a measure of risk, this paper will strictly focus on capital ratios as a measure of bank 
risk. It will then proceed to connect certain aspects of executive compensation to capital ratios to make 
a discovery about parts of compensation and capital risk at banks. The proceeding section will discuss 
tests and the results of these tests and will be followed by a conclusion about these results.  
3.) DATA AND SAMPLE 
For my sample, I found the fifty largest banks in the US, by asset size, on the FFIEC’s website. 
The FFIEC (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council) is a government agency that prescribes 
uniform principles, standards, and report forms for federal examination, according to their website. The 
FFIEC aids in the examination of banks by regulators by providing banks with the same forms and 
standards across the country.20 Banks were then narrowed down to only publicly traded banks. Non-
publicly traded banks do not have to provide financial information to the public. Forty three banks 
remained after non-publicly traded banks were eliminated. Call reports for each of the forty three banks 
were downloaded in order to get capital ratios for each bank. A call report is a form that banks across 
the US fill out every quarter so that regulators can monitor the condition and the performance of the 
bank. Call reports contain important financial information on the bank, but for the purposes of this 
paper, only certain capital ratios were collected from the call reports. 
Data on bank CEO compensation was collected from the Execucomp database for the year 2012. 
Execucomp is a database that includes information on executive compensation for S&P 1000 firms 
starting in 1992. Executive compensation data in Execucomp includes base salary, bonus, and stock 
option information. In addition, the database also provides company financial data starting in 1992. 
Executive compensation was broken down and defined by three main variables. The first variable used 
was SALARY, which measures the dollar value of an executive’s base salary during the fiscal year. The 
second variable used was BONUS, which is the bonus earned by that executive in the given fiscal year. 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL measures the market value of in-the-money stock options at fiscal yearend. 
It is found by calculating the difference between the exercise price of the options and the close price of 
the company’s primary issue of stock at year end.  The fourth variable used was SHROWN_TOT, which 
measures the shares owned by an executive. SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCT measures the percentage of 
                                                          
19Handorf, William C. "Bank Risk Management, Regulation and CEO Compensation after the Panic of 2008" (2013), 
39-50   
20FFIEC Home Page. FFIEC (2017)  
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total shares owned by the executive excluding options. Also, EQUITY_PCT was a variable used to 
calculate the percentage of compensation that was equity based for a given fiscal year. It was calculated 
by adding salary and bonus for a CEO, dividing that by total compensation, and then subtracting the 
result from one (1-((bonus+salary)/total compensation). Finally, the variable TDC1 was used to measure 
the total compensation of an executive for a given year. This variable takes into account the sum of 
salary, bonus, and equity based compensation. In addition, the age of the CEO was used as a variable, 
and is listed as AGE. For the purposes of this paper, salary and bonus will be considered cash based 
compensation, whereas variables measuring equity based compensation will be considered incentive 
based compensation. Compensation variables will be tested against capital ratios and other financial 
ratios in an attempt to test a relationship between variables.    
  Capital ratios were collected for the year 2013. A one year difference between executive 
compensation data and capital ratio data ensured that there was enough time for executive 
compensation to possibly cause a change in capital ratios. There are three main variables used for 
capital ratios. The first variable was TIER1_LEV_RATIO which is the tier 1 leverage ratio. It is calculated 
by dividing tier 1 capital into a banks’ total average assets (Tier 1/AvgAssets). This variable provides a 
dollar amount of tier 1 capital compared to a dollar amount of average assets. For example, a tier 1 
leverage ratio of .5 can be read as “for every 1 dollar of average assets, the bank has $.5 in tier 1 
capital.” The second variable used was TIER1_RBC_RATIO which is the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio 
taken by dividing tier 1 capital into risk-weighted assets (Tier 1/RWA). This measure shows a dollar 
amount of tier 1 capital compared to a dollar amount of risk-weighted assets. The final variable used 
was TOTAL_RBC which is the total risk-based capital ratio. It is calculated by dividing total risk-based 
capital into total risk-weighted assets (Total RBC/RWA). It is read as a dollar amount of risk-weighted 
capital compared to a dollar amount of risk-weighted assets. Together, these three variables provide 
capital measures for a bank and are determinants of capital risk at a bank.   
 In addition, variables that capture basic financial information about a bank were used. COMMEQ 
is a variable that measures the common equity at a bank. It is calculated by adding Common Stock, 
Capital Surplus, Retained Earnings, and Treasury Stock adjustments. ROEAVG measures the return on 
average equity. It calculated by dividing net income by the average of the most current year’s Total 
Common Equity. It provides a measurement of how well a bank is creating a return for its stock holders. 
A higher return on average equity means the bank is doing a good job creating a return for investors 
compared to a lower return on average equity. ASSETS measures the total assets reported by the bank 
for a given year. ROA measures the return on assets and is calculated by diving net income by reported 
assets. It provides a value for how well a bank is generating an income on its assets. For example, an 
ROA of .9 indicates a bank is generating 90 cents in income for every dollar of assets. TRS1YR measures 
the total one year return to the shareholders for the given fiscal year. A higher TRS1YR indicates a bank 
is generating more of a return for its shareholders. 
For this paper, capital ratios are the dependent variables with the goal of establishing a 
relationship with executive compensation structure. In addition, basic financial information variables will 
be used as control variables during regression analysis. The hypothesis of this paper is that incentive-
based compensation will decrease capital ratios which will in turn increase capital risk at banks. Higher 
salary and bonus variables, as a proportion of total compensation, should be a positively related to the 
capital ratios. A statistically significant positive relationship would indicate that a higher cash-based 
compensation program increases capital ratios which will in turn decrease capital risk. Alternatively, 
 
13 
  
equity-based variables, as a proportion of total compensation, should have a negative relationship with 
capital ratio variables. This would indicate that the higher equity based salary and executive is 
compensated with, the lower the capital ratios indicating higher capital risk.      
4.) METHODOLOGY 
 To begin regression analysis, descriptive statistics were used to provide the mean, median, and 
standard deviation of variables. In addition, the minimum and maximum, as well as the number of 
observations for each variable, are shown. To start with compensation data, the average total 
compensation of CEOs in the 43 largest publicly traded banks in America is about $6.7 million with a 
standard deviation of $5.2 million. These statistics show that total executive compensation has a wide 
range among executives in our sample. In addition, the average age of executives in the sample is just 
over 56 years.  
 The average base salary of executives in 2012 is about $970,000 and the average bonus is about 
$491,000. The market value of shares owned by an executive averages about $1.08 million. Equity 
owned as a percentage of total compensation averages about 72%. In addition, executives in our sample 
average about .41% of total shares outstanding of their given bank. Based on descriptive statistics, 
executives in the sample are being compensated more with equity based forms of compensation and 
less with cash-based forms of compensation.  
Common equity outstanding is averaging about $26.5 billion for banks in our sample. It should 
be noted that the standard deviation of common equity outstanding is about $54.2 billion. This large 
standard deviation implies that the range of common equity is large, with some banks having over one 
billion dollars outstanding of common equity. On average, banks in the sample are generating a return 
for their shareholders. The average return on average equity is about 9.4% and the average total return 
for shareholders is about 26%. Average asset size of the banks in the sample, is about $27.5 billion with 
a standard deviation of $58 billion. The standard deviation indicates that the asset size of the bigger 
banks in the sample is much larger than that of the smaller banks in the sample. Banks in the sample are 
generating a return on assets. On average, banks are generating $.90 for every dollar of assets.  
Capital ratios for banks in the sample meet Basel III standards. Basel III states that the tier 1 
leverage ratio must be 4% at a minimum. The average Tier 1 leverage ratio for the sample is about 9.2%, 
with the lowest ratio, at about 5.3%, still meeting standards. Basel also states that the Tier 1 risk-based-
capital ratio must be 6%. The average Tier 1 RBC ratio for the sample is 12.2% with the lowest ratio at 
7.5% still meeting standards. In addition, Basel also states that the total RBC ratio must be at least 8%. 
The average total RBC ratio is 13.8% with the lowest ratio, at 10.3%, still meeting standards. 
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Table 2      Summary Statistics  
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum  Maximum 
TDC1 43 6699.12 4846.07 5212.64 1375.00 22602.00 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL 43 3548.83 112.40 10877.29 0.00 50824.00 
AGE 43 56.70 55.00 7.30 39.00 77.00 
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCTSHROWN_TOT 41 0.41 0.12 0.58 0.01 2.74 
SHROWN_TOT 41 1079.89 713.63 1398.73 41.32 7657.00 
SALARY 43 970.81 900.00 529.29 0.00 2800.00 
BONUS 43 491.48 0.00 1360.09 0.00 5700.00 
COMMEQ 43 26579.03 3268.94 54230.09 589.12 218188.00 
ROEAVG 43 9.45 10.00 7.26 -12.60 34.35 
ASSETS 43 274896.77 30324.40 581764.84 5464.00 2359141.00 
ROA 43 0.91 0.92 0.73 -1.35 3.11 
TRS1YR 43 26.12 19.87 25.05 -16.02 109.78 
CO_PER_ROL 43 29352.44 30401.00 12243.73 5861.00 46862.00 
EQUITY_PCT 43 0.72 0.76 0.19 0.26 0.99 
TIER1_LEV_RATIO 42 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.17 
TIER1_RBC_RATIO 42 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.16 
TOTAL_RBC 42 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.19 
Table 1     Variable Description  
Variable Name  Description 
TDC1   
Total Compensation (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual + Restricted Stock 
Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of Option Grants) ($000) 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL  Estimated Value of In-the-Money Unexercised Exercisable Options ($000)  
AGE  Executive’s Age 
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS_PCTSHROWN_TOT  Percentage of Total Shares Owned – Options Excluded 
SHROWN_TOT  Value of shares owned by the executive ($000) 
SALARY  
The dollar value of the base salary earned by executive for given fiscal 
year ($000) 
BONUS  
The dollar value of a bonus earned by executive for given fiscal year 
($000) 
EQUITY_PCT  Equity as percentage of total compensation 
COMMEQ  
The sum of Common Stock, Capital Surplus, Retained Earnings, and 
Treasury Stock adjustments ($000,000) 
ROEAVG  Return on Average Equity 
ASSETS  The Total Assets as reported by the company ($000,000) 
ROA  Return on Assets 
TRS1YR  1 Yr. Total Return to Shareholders  
CO_PER_ROL  ID number for each executive/company combination 
TIER1_LEV_RATIO  Tier 1 leverage ratio 
TIER1_RBC_RATIO  Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio  
TOTAL_RBC  Total risk-based capital ratio 
LOG_ASSETS  The natural logarithm of assets 
LOG_AGE  The natural logarithm of age 
LOG_TDC1   The natural logarithm of total compensation 
*Descriptions from Execucomp database   
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Descriptive statistics give a general overview of how executives in the sample are being 
compensated, how large these banks are, and how well capital ratios are being met. From the statistics, 
on average executives are being paid more with equity based incentive compensation rather than being 
paid with cash based forms of compensation. But, capital ratios are still meeting Basel III minimums, and 
on average are much higher than Basel III minimums. On average, returns on assets and returns for 
shareholders are also being seen. With this all taken into account, executives in the sample are keeping 
capital risk low by maintaining high capital ratios while still generating a return on assets and for 
shareholders. 
Following an analysis of descriptive statistics, a correlation test was run for variables used during 
regression analysis. Tests were run to ensure that no two variables, with strong correlation coefficients, 
were the same measures. No two variables had strong enough correlation to conclude that they were 
the same measures. Correlation tests for all variables can be seen in Table 3.  
 In addition, the natural logarithm of certain variables was added to the list of variables. The 
natural log of assets, age, and total compensation were calculated based off of the sample. The natural 
logarithm of these three variables was taken because these variables are typically not normally 
distributed. The logarithm ensured a more even distribution of the data for these variables. This would 
remove any outliers and allow for better results during regression analysis.    
 Following the univariate correlation test, multiple regression analysis was run using different 
models. In each model, different variables were tested against the three capital ratios. The first 
regression test used variables EQUITY_PCT, ROA, ROE_AVG, LOG_ASSETS, TRS1YR, LOG_TDC1, and 
LOG_AGE. The second regression test run used the same variables but removed ROE_AVG. this variable 
was thought to possibly be a similar measure to TRS1YR, because both variables are measuring return 
on equity. The final regression analysis run used the same variables as the second test, but removed 
LOG_AGE and LOG_TDC1. These variables were removed because they measure attributes of the 
executive and may not be confounding variables on capital ratios. This allowed for a more concise test 
between executive compensation and capital ratios. In addition, if for some reason any banks had no 
data recorded for variables being tested, these banks were removed from the sample. Only one bank 
was missing data for some variables, causing the sample size to decrease to forty-two.     
5.) REGRESSION RESULTS 
  Table 4 provides results from the first set of regression analysis. When looking at results, P-
values between the majority of independent variables and capital ratios are above ten percent. This 
means that the null hypothesis is accepted for these results. There is no statistical relationship between 
the majority independent variables and capital ratios. Most notably, the results of equity percentage 
and capital ratios have high p-values indicating no statistically significant relationship. This finding is 
inconsistent with findings in previous literature where equity-based compensation had a significant 
negative relationship with bank risk. Bank risk, in this paper, is viewed as capital ratios at banks. The 
hypothesis was there should be a negative relationship between equity percentage and capital ratios. 
This would indicate that a higher equity percentage of capital ratios provides a lower capital ratio, which 
would show a higher capital risk. For the tier 1 leverage ratio and the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, there 
is a negative relationship with equity percentage. But the P-values in the results are too high to conclude 
a relationship that is statistically significant enough.  
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One result in Table 4 is significant enough to make a conclusion with 90% confidence. The 
relationship between total 1 year stock return and the tier 1 leverage ratio has a positive relationship 
and has a P-value equal to .09 which allows a rejection of the null hypothesis. Based on the sample, with 
90% confidence a conclusion can be made that the higher the tier 1 leverage ratio, the higher 1 year 
stock return to shareholders. This positive relationship bodes well for banks and for regulators as banks 
are able to generate a return for stockholders and are also able to keep capital ratios high lowering 
capital risk.            
    Parameter estimate 
Results can be read as follows: (Standard error) 
    [P-value] 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dep Variable TIER_1_LEV_RATIO TIER_1_RBC_RATIO TOTAL_RBC
.0392                                    
(.1027)                                                                                
[.7050]                                                                              
Intercept
EQUITY_PCT
-.0378                                                                          
(.0238)                                                          
[.1208]
.0197                                                                          
(.0150)                                                                         
[.1978]
-.0017                                           
(.0014)                                                          
[.2418]
-.0045                                                       
(.0041)                                        
[.2742]
.0002                                         
(.0001)                        
[.0948]
.0127                                            
(.0107)                                   
[.2454]
.0030                                           
(.0241)                                                         
[.9017]
ROA
ROEAVG
LOG_ASSETS
TRS1YR
LOG_TDC1
.0147                                     
(.0103)                                
[.1636]
-.0300                                  
(.0232)                              
[.2045]
F-stat                                 
[P-value]
0.0579
1.36                                                                
[.2536]
LOG_AGE
Observations
R-squared
42
-.0138         
(.0229)                                  
[.5493]
-.0010
(.0144)
[.9467]
.0001                              
(.0013)                             
[.9463]
-.0046                   
(.0039)                                          
[.2484]
.0001                                
(.0001)                         
[.9073]
Table 4      Determinants of Capital Ratios 
-.0203                                                
(.0217)                         
[.3571]
42
-0.0369
.79                                
[.5992]
42
-0.0778
.58         
[.7695]
.1674                                                           
(.0926)                                
[.0794]
.0090                                             
(.0214)                        
[.6769]
-.0026                                      
(.0135)                                    
[.8518]
.0001                                 
(.0013)                            
[.9785]
-.0019                                                             
(.0037)                            
[.6136]
.0001                                         
(.0001)                                  
[.4803]
.0078                            
(.0097)                                             
[.4274]
.1781                                  
(.0988)
[.0802]
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*The tables above can be read as 
follows. The capital ratios are always 
the dependent variable and are 
listed at the top, each having its own 
column. The independent variables 
are listed on the side each having its 
own row. In each box is the results 
for that specific independent and 
dependent variable. The first 
number listed is the parameter 
estimate for those two variables. It 
represents the values for the 
regression equation 
(Ypredicted=mx+b) for predicting 
the dependent variable from the 
independent variable. The second 
number in () is the standard error. It 
measures a test for whether or not 
the result is significantly different 
from zero. The third number is the 
P-value, and is the most important 
result from the table. This value 
tests the null hypothesis (in this case 
the null hypothesis is that there is 
no relationship) and if it can be 
accepted or rejected. Ideally, this 
value should be as low as possible 
which would allow the rejection of 
the null hypothesis. The number of 
observations is provided at the 
bottom. R-squared is provided as 
well. This variable measures the 
proportion of variance in the 
dependent variable which can be 
predicted from the independent 
variable. The P-value is associated 
with the F-value, and the hope is 
that the P-value is very small. The 
smaller the P-value, the more 
significant the relationship is 
between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable. 
(Descriptions provided by SAS 
website) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dep Variable TIER_1_LEV_RATIO TIER1_RBC_RATIO TOTAL_RBC
LOG_AGE
Observations
R-squared
F-stat                                 
[P-value]
EQUITY_PCT
ROA
LOG_ASSETS
TRS1YR
LOG_TDC1
1.33                                                  
[.2683]
.0361                                               
(.1033)                                         
[.7286]
-.0343                                             
(.0237)                                                     
[.1573]
.0029                                      
(.0052)                                          
[.5764]
-.0048                                               
(.0041)                                 
[.2502]
.0147                                                  
(.0102)                                                
[.1577]
.0128                                   
(.0108)                         
[.2431]              
.0035                                 
(.0242)                             
[.8859]
42
0.0467
42
-0.0073
.95                                
[.4721]
42
-0.0472
.69                                
[.6574]
-.0300                                      
(.0228)                                                          
[.1974]
Intercept
Table 5          Determinants of Capital Ratios 
.1783                                                           
(.0973)                                                      
[.0755]
-.0140                                            
(.0224)                                              
[.5346]
-.0001                                                             
(.0049)                                                         
[.9915]
-.0046                                           
(.0039)                                         
[.2423]
.0001                                       
(.0001)                                 
[.9066]
.1675
(.0912)                            
[.0749]
.0089                
(.0209)                   
[.6725]
-.0022          
(.0046)     
[.6336]
-.0019        
(.0036)                           
[.6088]
.0001           
(.0001)                           
[.4740]
.00025                                     
(.0001)                                       
[.0937]
.0078     
(.0095)          
[.4207]
-.0203                              
(.0214)          
[.3497]
 
19 
  
Table 5 provides results from the second set of regression analysis. As stated above, these 
results have the independent variable ROEAVG removed. Similar to Table 4, the results in Table 5 shows 
that where the majority of independent variable P-values are high. This indicates that there is no P-value 
statistically significant enough to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
variables. The tier 1 leverage ratio and tier 1 risk-based capital ratio are indicating a negative 
relationship, but are not significant enough to make a conclusion. Total 1 year stock returns has the 
lowest P-value and a positive relationship to the tier 1 leverage ratio. With 90% confidence, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected, and the conclusion can be made that there is a positive relationship 
between 1 year stock returns and the tier 1 leverage ratio.  
Table 6 provides results from the final regression analysis. This regression analysis removed the 
variables LOG_AGE and LOG_TDC1 as these are CEO-specific variables. Similar to the previous results, 
the p-values remain high indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The relationship 
between equity percentage and the tier 1 leverage ratio remains negative, but is positive for the tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio and the total risk-based capital ratio. But the three P-values are too high to make 
a conclusion that rejects the null hypothesis. The lowest P-value is the relationship between total 1 year 
stock returns and the tier 1 leverage ratio. With about 94% confidence, the null hypothesis can be 
rejected, and a positive relationship between the two variables can be established.  
Overall, regression tests produced no P-values among independent variables and capital ratios 
that are low enough to reject the null hypothesis. This indicates that in the sample, there is no 
relationship between equity percentage and the three capital ratios. It should be noted that a regression 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dep Variable TIER1_LEV_RATIO TIER_1_RBC_RATIO TOTAL_RBC
42
0.0097
1.10                        
[.3709]
.1172                              
(.0196)                          
[<.0001]
.0229                              
(.0146)                                  
[.1268]
-.0032                          
(.0042)                       
[.4577]
.0004                                  
(.0019)                  
[.8352]
.0001                           
(.0001)            
[.3438]
.19                             
[.9410]
Intercept
EQUITY_PCT
ROA
LOG_ASSETS
TRS1YR
Observations
R-squared
F-stat                                 
[P-value]
Table 6    Determinants of Capital Ratios 
1.65                                        
[.1830]
.0003                                         
(.0001)                              
[.0587]
42
.1167                                   
(.0215)                                    
[<.0001]
.0114                                    
(.0161)                                 
[.4812]
-.0020                                    
(.0046)                                    
[.6605]
-.0002                                 
(.0021)                                   
[.9234]
0.0594
.1014                                        
(.0222)                               
[<.0001]
-.0154                                       
(.0166)                                  
[.3601]
.0006                            
(.0048)                                         
[.9021]
-.0006                                 
(.0022)                                       
[.7865]
.0001                                    
(.0001)                                 
[.6484]
42
-0.0856
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test was done using the natural logarithm of salary. The natural logarithm of salary was used to more 
evenly distribute salary data. These results also found no P-values low enough to reject the null 
hypothesis. This regression test was not shown in the paper because the natural logarithm of salary was 
highly correlated with equity percentage indicating that they were too similar of measures.            
6.) CONCLUSION 
 This paper examines the relationship between executive compensation and capital ratios at 
banks in the US. Executive compensation is divided by cash based forms of compensation (salary and 
bonus) and incentive-based compensation (equity) given to the executive. The sample covers the years 
2012-2013 and includes the 43 largest publicly traded banks in the US. Executive compensation data was 
used from the year 2012 whereas capital ratios were found for the executive’s respective banks for the 
year 2013. This ensured enough time would be given to see the possible effect of a compensation 
structure on capital ratios at an executive’s respective bank. The hypothesis of this paper was that the 
higher incentive based compensation, the lower the capital ratios. Lower capital ratios indicate a higher 
capital risk at banks.  
   This paper found no relationship significant enough to make a conclusion about executive 
compensation forms and capital ratios at bank. No relationship was established between these two 
variables based on data found on banks used in the sample. Unfortunately, the beginning hypothesis of 
this paper was unable to be proven correct based on results from regression analysis.  
 There are many possible explanations for why no relationship significant enough was found, but 
one reason seems to stand out from the rest. The sample pulled data from the 43 largest banks in the 
US based on asset size. Some of these banks have asset sizes of more than $1 trillion. But in addition to 
large banks, there are also many smaller community and regional banks that operate within the US. An 
article, published by MSNBC, discussed the asset size of the largest banks in America based on 
information provided by the Fed. The article states that in total, the five institutions—JPMorgan 
Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup and U.S. Bancorp—had just under $7 trillion in total 
assets as of the end of 2014. That's good for 44.61 percent of the industry total. It also leaves the other 
55.4 percent of the assets to be divided up among 6,504 other institutions21 (MSNBC). This means that 
the asset size of many of these smaller banks is much less than the largest banks in America.  
 Due to their small asset size, these banks may operate differently than the largest banks in the 
US. For example, many of these community banks only operate within certain regions, states, or parts of 
states. But these larger banks operate nationally and globally and in turn require more people to help 
meet the needs of customers throughout the globe. This means that CEOs at larger have a bigger staff 
and more people around them to help make decisions because of the asset size of the bank. CEOs at 
smaller banks have much more control, as these banks have less assets and don’t require the large staff 
that banks with trillions of dollars in assets require.  
 The sample in this paper came from the forty three largest banks in America and no relationship 
could be established between executive compensation and capital ratios at these banks. But this paper 
did not look at smaller banks where CEOs have greater control over the daily operations of the bank. 
The management staff at larger banks may have more people compared to the management staff at 
                                                          
21 Cox, Jeff. "5 Biggest Banks Now Own Almost Half the Industry." CNBC (2015) 
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some of the smaller banks. That means that the CEO at smaller banks has a wider focus and may have 
more of an impact on daily operations than the CEO at a larger bank who has an entire management 
staff to help them make decisions. This may point to the reason why a relationship could not be 
established using these larger banks. Executive compensation practices may have more of an effect on 
capital ratios at smaller banks than practices do at larger banks. There’s simply more activity that goes 
on at these larger banks, and changing the CEOs compensation to include more or less incentive pay 
may not cause the same outcome that it does at a smaller bank. 
 In addition, there may be other important factors beyond how the board compensates the CEO 
that are needed in determining capital ratios and bank risk. One factor can be the fact that at large 
banks, capital ratios are more dependent on regulator and credit rating agency’s requirements than on 
CEO compensation structure. Because of their large asset sizes and the general societal dependence on 
these large banks, these banks are constantly regulated and rated more than a smaller bank would be. 
Constant regulation causes these banks to focus on other daily activities, other than simple CEO 
compensation structure, that affect capital ratios. Regulators work with banks to ensure that risk-based 
capital requirements are met during the year.      
 With that being said, there are many future improvements that can be made to this research 
topic that this paper did not cover. Most notably, a study could be done using different sized banks in 
the US. This paper did not take into account the smaller banks in the US and this may have caused 
certain results to occur. However, future improvements could be done to include these small 
community banks into the sample. One way to do this is to simply include all publicly-traded banks in 
the US. This would allow for a sample to include banks of a wide range of asset sizes in a sample, and 
may cause a change in the results. In addition, adding a wider range of years to the sample may improve 
results as well. This would allow for an increase in the data size which may change results. It would also 
allow for different years to be compared to the effect of regulation on executive compensation. For 
example, Basel III was enacted in 2011 and set minimum capital ratios. Comparing years before and 
after 2011 would give insight to how well the regulation is having a positive impact on banks. 
 Overall, this paper found no relationship significant enough to make a conclusion about the 
relationship between executive compensation and capital ratios at banks. The fact that no statistical 
relationship was found may be a positive sign for current and future regulation. This paper was only 
concerned with CEO compensation variables and capital ratios between the years 2012 and 2013. This 
paper did not look at CEO compensation structure or capital ratios before the financial crisis in 2008. 
Before the crisis in 2008, both CEO compensation structure and capital ratios may have been different. 
Capital ratios most likely were low and CEO compensation was most likely still very high indicating that 
CEOs were still getting compensated with a lot of cash and equity but banks were running daily 
operations with a lot of risk. It was shown in the descriptive statistics that even the lowest capital ratios 
within the sample still met regulatory requirements which were set in the years following the crisis. 
Capital ratios at the banks that are controlling almost half of the total country’s deposits are meeting 
regulatory requirements and keeping capital risk low. This ensures that CEOs and other upper level 
management at large banks are keeping daily operations running smoothly and preventing capital ratios 
from going to low. Total CEO Compensation at large banks still remains high, but capital ratios also 
remain high which points to the fact that government regulation is continuing to keep bank risk low and 
working towards preventing future financial crises.  
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